As stated earlier

As stated earlier, we only know the external world through representation. But how do we make reason of it? In Aristotle’s understanding, our mental representations have an akin form to the external object, thus, they can be used to reason about it. (Reeves, 2017, 17) According to this understanding, the similarity stands between the object and the mental representation and, it helps us to reason about the external world. Yet, this still leaves room to make mistakes. How do we represent similarity? Similarity and representation are two different notions indeed. In American philosopher Nelson Goodman’s Languages of Art, resemblance is considered inadequate as a basis for representation. ‘An object resembles itself to the maximum degree but rarely represents itself; resemblance, unlike representation, is reflexive. Again, unlike representation, resemblance is symmetric: B is as much like A as A is like B, but while a painting may represent the Duke of Wellington, the Duke doesn’t represent the painting…Plainly resemblance in any degree is no sufficient condition for representation. (Goodman, 1976, 4)’ Consequently, my paintings are my representations of my indoor environment, but they do not represent their actual locations with their colours and perspectives.
‘It seems then that distortion, infidelity, lack of resemblance in some respect, may in general be crucial to the success of a representation. (van Fraassen, 2008, 13)’
Thus, as for van Fraassen representations are naturally perspectival and requires human purpose. The source of this perspective is the choice or intent of a representation user. Therefore, distortion in representation is the mark of this perspectival quality. (van fraassen, 2008, 24)
Regarding the context of my paintings, perspectival representation seems interesting to me. The conscious act of distortion and lack of resemblance is what I intend to apply to my paintings when reflecting a moment of myself or of an interior through my visual memories about them. My paintings represent my mental imageries, but, more explicitly, they represent the cognitive collages of the interiors I possess in my mind.